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abstract: An unresolved controversy regarding social behaviors is
exemplified when natural selection might lead to behaviors that maximize fitness at the social-group level but are costly at the individual
level. Except for the special case of groups of clones, we do not have
a general understanding of how and when group-optimal behaviors
evolve, especially when the behaviors in question are flexible. To
address this question, we develop a general model that integrates
behavioral plasticity in social interactions with the action of natural
selection in structured populations. We find that group-optimal behaviors can evolve, even without clonal groups, if individuals exhibit
appropriate behavioral responses to each other’s actions. The evolution of such behavioral responses, in turn, is predicated on the
nature of the proximate behavioral mechanisms. We model a particular class of proximate mechanisms, prosocial preferences, and
find that such preferences evolve to sustain maximum group benefit
under certain levels of relatedness and certain ecological conditions.
Thus, our model demonstrates the fundamental interplay between
behavioral responses and relatedness in determining the course of
social evolution. We also highlight the crucial role of proximate
mechanisms such as prosocial preferences in the evolution of behavioral responses and in facilitating evolutionary transitions in
individuality.
Keywords: goal-oriented behavior, Price equation, two-tiered model,
kin selection, multilevel selection, community reciprocity.

Introduction
Among the many debates on the evolution of social behaviors, perhaps none is older or more controversial than
the one surrounding the role and importance of grouplevel selection in the evolutionary process (WynneEdwards 1962; Williams 1966; Hamilton 1975; West et al.
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2007; Wilson and Wilson 2007; Leigh 2010). There is now
at least one important consensus that multilevel-selection
processes (which are motivated historically from models
of group-level selection) are mathematically equivalent to
kin-selection processes (which historically derive from
analyses of individual-level selection; Hamilton 1975;
Queller 1992). Even though few now dispute that some
selection at the group level (between-group selection, in
current terminology) occurs (West et al. 2007; Wilson and
Wilson 2007; Gardner and Grafen 2009), other issues remain controversial. Among these is the original question
in the debate, namely, how likely natural selection is to
lead to behaviors that maximize fitness at the group level.
It is well known that when selection within a group is
completely abolished, between-group selection can lead to
maximization of group fitness when appropriate genetic
variation exists and other evolutionary forces are weak.
Within-group selection disappears when the expected fitness of all individuals within a group is equalized either
as a result of clonality within groups or through mechanisms such as policing (in social insects) or fair meiosis
(genomes of sexual organisms; Leigh 1977; Alexander and
Borgia 1978; Frank 2003). Some taxa, such as eusocial
aphids, do live in clonal groups, but this is generally accepted to be a rare condition in nature outside of some
prokaryotic lineages (Levin et al. 1999). Repression of
competition is much more widespread and is found in
social insects, vertebrates, and human societies (Frank
2003 and references therein).
Another route for diminishing within-group differences
in fitness is behavioral coordination through individuals’
responses to their groupmates’ actions. Virtually all organisms exhibit social behaviors that are flexible or conditional on the behaviors of others, from bacteria (e.g.,
quorum sensing; Miller and Bassler 2001) to insects (e.g.,
reproductive strategies depending on social context; WestEberhard 1987), birds (e.g., responses of parents to each
other; Wright and Cuthill 1989), primates (e.g., reciprocal
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altruism; Brosnan and de Waal 2002), and obviously, humans. Not surprisingly, a large theoretical literature focuses
on the evolutionary consequences of particular kinds of
flexible (or conditional) behavior (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; McNamara et al. 1999; Lehmann and Keller
2006; Akçay et al. 2009; Boyd et al. 2010). However, the
general question of whether and when flexible behaviors
can allow group-optimal outcomes to be evolutionarily
stable has not been answered. Another related body of
work that deals with “indirect genetic effects” (IGEs; Griffing 1967, 1981a, 1981b; Moore et al. 1997; Wolf et al.
1999; Bijma et al. 2007; Bijma and Wade 2008; McGlothlin
et al. 2010) uses quantitative genetics to measure how the
response of an individual’s phenotype to the phenotypes
of others affects selection pressures in social interactions.
However, these models do not consider how the IGEs
themselves evolve (Bijma and Wade 2008; McGlothlin et
al. 2010). An element missing from both strands of theory
is the role of proximate mechanisms: behavioral responses
(or IGEs) are produced by proximate mechanisms, which
can either constrain or facilitate the evolution of different
types of responses. Despite their significance, proximate
mechanisms are only infrequently integrated into models
of social evolution in structured populations. Thus, we
currently lack a general framework for understanding both
the selective effect and the evolution of behavioral responses in structured populations based on the proximate
mechanisms that generate such responses.
In this article, we demonstrate how such a framework
can be built from the Price equation (Price 1970, 1972).
Our framework shows that behavioral responses and relatedness due to population structure play exactly symmetric roles in determining the direction of selection on
a social trait. When using the multilevel-selection perspective, our framework also shows how cooperative behaviors are always selected against at the within-group level
while being selected for at the between-group level, regardless of behavioral responsiveness or relatedness. We
then apply our framework to the problem of when natural
selection can lead to maximization of fitness at the group
level, or group optimality. Our focus on group optimality
is motivated in part by the fact that group optimality is
intimately related to evolutionary transitions in individuality (ETIs), that is, groups becoming new, higher-level
individuals (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Michod
2005, 2006). We show that behavioral responses significantly increase the conditions under which group optimality is evolutionarily stable. Using a specific proximate
mechanism for the production of behavioral responses, we
also show how behavioral responses that lead to group
optimality might evolve. The proximate mechanism we
employ is the social-preferences, or motivations, model of
Akçay et al. (2009), which we extend to the case of N-

player public-goods games. Group-optimal outcomes can
evolve in this model through the evolution of how much
individuals value the public good versus their private costs.
Model
Integrating Behavioral Responses and Kin Selection
We use a central framework of social-evolution theory, the
Price equation (Price 1970, 1972), to partition the effect
of selection on a heritable trait into components due to
the effect of the trait of the focal individual and those due
to effects on the traits of others in the population (the socalled kin-selection partition; Price 1970; Queller 1992;
Bijma and Wade 2008). The change in the populationaverage breeding value (additive genetic component) due
to the effect of selection can be written as
DG ∝ Var (Gi)[bFi, pi ⫹ (N ⫺ 1)rbFi, pj ],

(1)

where Gi is the breeding value of the focal individual, N
is the size of the social-interaction group, r is scaled genetic
relatedness, and bFi, pi and bFi, pj are partial-regression coefficients of the focal individual’s fertility (Fi) on its own
phenotype (pi) and on its neighbors’ phenotypes (pj),
respectively.
In many structured populations, fitness is a function of
both fertility and demographic effects such as local competition for limited resources with related individuals (Taylor 1992; Queller 1994). The scaled-relatedness coefficient
r is defined to account for these demographic effects
(Frank 1998) and can be calculated under a variety of lifehistory and demographic scenarios (Lehmann and Rousset
2010). As result of this accounting, bFi, pi and bFi, pj measure
the effects of the phenotypes on fertility only. For example,
in appendix A2, available online, we provide a derivation
of the scaled-relatedness coefficient r for a population with
overlapping generations and an island model of migration
between D different demes, each of which has n individuals
(Wright 1943). In that case, we find that
rp

R ⫺ R∗
,
1 ⫺ R∗

where R is the unscaled-relatedness coefficient defined in
terms of probabilities of identity by descent and

[

R ∗ p (1 ⫺ m)2 ⫹

](

)

m2 1 n ⫺ 1
⫹
R;
D⫺1 n
n

R in this example is Wright’s FST coefficient (Wright 1949;
Rousset 2004). For an island model with overlapping generations, r ≈ s/n, where s is the probability that adults survive from one generation to the next and D and n are
large and m is small (see app. A2). Finally, we make the
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additional assumption that r is determined only by the
demographic parameters of the population and not by
individual phenotypes, which implies that r is a constant.
This assumption is justified by our assumption of weak
selection below (Rousset 2004).
Both b Fi, pi and b Fi, pj depend on how individuals respond
to each others’ actions. To model these behavioral responses, we generalize the modeling approach of a recent
series of models (McNamara et al. 1999; Taylor and Day
2004; André and Day 2007; Akçay et al. 2009; Akçay and
Roughgarden 2011) that consider the evolution of behaviors in a two-tiered dynamic. Consider a social interaction
with N individuals, where each individual i carries out an
action ai, which is a real, positive number. For example,
ai can denote how much individual i contributes to offspring provisioning in a cooperatively breeding group. Instead of treating the actions ai as being directly determined
by the genetic makeup of the individuals, we assume that
the actions that each individual carries out are determined
through a behavioral dynamic that operates at the timescale of the social interaction. We assume that this behavioral dynamic is fast and quickly settles on some equilibrium action a i∗ for each individual i. This “behavioral
equilibrium” (denoted by a∗ p (a ∗1 , a ∗2 , … a ∗N)) is a function of the decision-making mechanism of the individuals,
that is, the proximate mechanism of behavior. For example, McNamara et al. (1999) model the proximate
mechanism as a linear-response rule, where the action of
an individual is a linear function of its opponent’s action,
while Akçay et al. (2009) model the proximate mechanism
as a motivation to maximize a behavioral objective or
social preference function.
We assume that the proximate mechanism is modulated
by a genetically encoded trait that we term the “motivational trait,” since it affects the decision making of the
individuals. The motivational trait is the phenotype p,
whose evolution we track in equation (1). In our model,
the motivational trait p is a proxy for neurophysiological
or endocrinological traits, such as the expression pattern
of neuropeptide receptors (e.g., oxytocin or vasopressin in
mammals) in key brain regions or the functional responses
of specific neural circuits to external stimuli. Recent research has shown that such physiological traits in humans
and other animals affect many types of social behaviors,
such as pair bonding (Young et al. 2011), parental care
(Donaldson and Young 2008), trust in economic games
(Baumgartner et al. 2008), and the tendency to aggregate
in groups (Goodson and Wang 2006).
By tracking the evolution of the motivational trait p
instead of the equilibrium action a ∗, we can study the
evolution of the proximate mechanism that generates behaviors instead of the behaviors alone. In principle, different proximate mechanisms (e.g., linear-response rules

or behavioral objectives) might produce the same outcome
in a specific behavioral context (e.g., parental care). However, in different behavioral contexts (e.g., food sharing),
the outcomes produced by these proximate mechanisms
can be divergent. Studying the proximate mechanisms underlying behaviors would allow us to understand the evolution of behavioral correlations across different social
contexts.
Figure 1 illustrates how, by determining properties of
neurophysiology, the motivational trait p modulates individual decision-making processes and thus affects the
actions that individuals choose at the behavioral equilibrium. The behavioral equilibrium is a function of the combination of the social partners’ motivational traits, or
mathematically, a∗(p1, … , pN). The action of each individual at the behavioral equilibrium (e.g., the level of helping), in turn, determines the payoff that each individual
gets (e.g., the amount of resources an individual has as a
result of each partner’s level of helping). We denote as

Figure 1: Relationship between motivational traits pi and the actions
individuals choose at the behavioral equilibrium. For each individual
i in the social interaction, the motivational trait pi determines some
aspects of that individual’s neurophysiology, which in turn affect the
decision-making process of that individual. The behavioral equilibrium actions, a∗ p (a∗1 , … , a∗N), are the outcome of the behavioral
dynamic defined by the decision-making mechanisms of all the individuals involved in the interaction. Illustration from Pearson Scott
Foresman, released into public domain at Wikimedia Commons.
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ui(a 1, a 2 , … , a N) individual i’s payoff from the social interaction. In general, a focal individual’s fertility Fi will be
some function of the payoff ui, possibly integrated over
some time period and possibly including stochastic effects.
To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that the fertility
of individual i is proportional to the payoff ui evaluated
at the behavioral equilibrium a∗,
∗
∗
F(p
i
1, … , pN) { ui(a 1 (p1, … , pN), … , a N(p1, … , pN)).

This expression signifies that ultimately, the fertility of a
focal individual is a function of both its own and its partners’ motivational traits.
Assuming that the effect of the motivational trait on
fertility is weak (i.e., that selection is weak; Taylor and
Frank 1996), the partial-regression coefficient of the focal
individual i’s fertility on its own motivational trait is the
direct effect of the change in the focal individual’s motivational trait plus the indirect effect arising from other
individuals in the group responding to the focal individual,
bFi, pi p

( 冘 )

⭸Fi
⭸a ∗ ⭸ui
⭸u
p i
⫹ r i
,
⭸pi
⭸pi ⭸a i j(i ij ⭸a j apa∗

(2)

where the term rij p (⭸a j∗/⭸pi)/(⭸a i∗/⭸pi) p ⭸a j∗/⭸a i∗ quantifies how individual j’s equilibrium action changes in response to individual i’s equilibrium action. Thus, rij describes the relative behavioral response of j to i; we term
it the “response coefficient” of j to i (Akçay et al. 2009).
The mechanistic details of a specific behavioral model,
such as coordinated punishment (Boyd et al. 2010) or
prosocial preferences (Levine 1998; Falk and Fischbacher
2006; Akçay et al. 2009), determine the value of the response coefficient. In general, rij may capture the equilibrium effect of many different behavioral models, including
social norms and systems of rewards and punishments
(Levin 2009). We emphasize that even though we treat the
response coefficient rij as an index here, it is actually determined by how individuals settle on their equilibrium
actions, and therefore it will evolve as the population distribution of the motivational trait evolves. We will turn to
the evolution of r itself shortly.
For the effect on fertility of a change in a social partner’s
motivational trait pj, we have

( 冘 )

⭸a j ⭸ui
⭸Fi
⭸u
p
⫹ rjk i
.
⭸pj
⭸pj ⭸a j k(j ⭸ak apa∗
∗

bFi, pj p

(3)

Again, this partial-regression coefficient consists of the direct effect on i’s payoff of changing social partner j’s action
plus the effects of responses such a change elicits from all
other individuals (including focal individual i).
Assuming that we are interested only in small deviations
in the motivational-trait distribution from a monomorphic population (a population composed of individuals

with the same trait), we can set rij p r for all j ( i and
⭸a i∗/⭸pi p ⭸a j∗/⭸pj. We further define a benefit b {
⭸ui /⭸a j for i ( j (“other-only” benefit; Pepper 2000) and
a cost c { ⫺⭸ui /⭸a i, where the derivatives are evaluated
at a∗ p (a ∗, … , a ∗); b and c are generalizations of the
benefits and costs, respectively, in a linear public-goods
game. Note that b and c are defined locally at the current
phenotypic value of the population and the behavioral
equilibrium it produces. As the behavioral equilibrium
changes because of shifts in the population motivational
trait, the values of b and c change as well.
Using the definitions of r, b, and c, we can rewrite the
change in the population-average breeding value in equation (1) as
DG ∝ k (br(N ⫺ 1) ⫺ c ⫹ r(N ⫺ 1)
# {b[r(N ⫺ 2) ⫹ 1] ⫺ rc}).

(4)

By setting DG p 0 in equation (1), we obtain the firstorder condition for a given motivational trait to be evolutionarily stable (ES) as
b
1 ⫹ rr(N ⫺ 1)
p
.
c
(N ⫺ 1)[r ⫹ r ⫹ (N ⫺ 2)rr]

(5)

A motivational trait that satisfies this first-order condition
is a candidate evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS; Maynard
Smith and Price 1973). Equation (5) is a kind of Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton 1964) incorporating behavioral responses among N interacting individuals. Expressions similar to equation (5) are derived by Lehmann and Keller
(2006, eq. [4]) and by McGlothlin et al. (2010, eq. [18])
using IGEs, whereas Bijma and colleagues (Bijma et al.
2007; Bijma and Wade 2008) develop a related expression
(see eq. [15] in Bijma and Wade 2008) based on a different
approach to partitioning the Price equation.
Importantly, equation (5) is exactly symmetric in r and
r, meaning that behavioral responses and relatedness play
mathematically analogous roles in determining evolutionary stability. This does not mean, however, that one can
collapse them into a single index (e.g., an index of assortment) without loss of generality, since the two appear
separately in equation (5). Hence, both behavioral responses and relatedness must be considered when determining the total selection pressure on a given social
behavior.
The first-order condition (eq. [5]) is necessary but not
sufficient for the candidate ESS to be the stable outcome
of an evolutionary dynamic; such stability requires that
certain second-order conditions hold as well. In particular,
the second-order ESS condition must be satisfied to ensure
that the candidate ESS is in fact a fitness maximum, as
opposed to a minimum. This condition can be difficult
to calculate exactly in structured populations, since it re-
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quires determining how selection changes relatedness (Ajar
2003; Rousset 2004), and we refrain from calculating it
here. Another second-order condition, called convergence
stability (CS; Eshel and Motro 1981; Christiansen 1991),
is required to ensure that a population that is near a candidate ESS evolves toward the candidate ESS through successive invasion and fixation of mutations. In appendix
A4, available online, we derive a general expression for the
CS condition. The CS condition depends crucially on how
the response coefficient r changes with the evolving motivational trait, which in turn is a function of the proximate
mechanism that produces the behavioral responses. In
“The Evolution of Behavioral Responses through Prosocial
Preferences,” we model a proximate mechanism based on
goal-oriented motivations in public-goods games to study
the coevolution of behavioral responses and investment in
a public good.
Behavioral Responses and the Levels of Selection
In deriving equation (4), we used the kin-selection partition of the Price equation; an alternative partition is the
“group-selection” (or “multilevel-selection”) partition that
decomposes the effect of selection into within-group and
between-group components (Hamilton 1975; Queller
1992; see app. A1, available online). Upon rearranging the
terms in equation (4) for DG, we find that
DG ∝ k{[b(N ⫺ 1) ⫺ c][1 ⫹ r(N ⫺ 1)][1 ⫹ r(N ⫺ 1)]
⫺ (N ⫺ 1)(b ⫹ c)(1 ⫺ r)(1 ⫺ r)},

(6)

where the within-group component of selection is
⫺(N ⫺ 1)(b ⫹ c)(1 ⫺ r)(1 ⫺ r)

(7)

and the between-group component is
[b(N ⫺ 1) ⫺ c][1 ⫹ r(N ⫺ 1)][1 ⫹ r(N ⫺ 1)].

potentially beneficial, then between-group selection always
favors an increase in the amount of cooperation, regardless
of levels of responsiveness and relatedness. In other words,
setting DG 1 0 and using equation (6) together imply that
the amount of cooperation increases if and only if
between-group selection is stronger than within-group selection. A special case of this result was discovered by Wade
(1980), who considered fixed altruistic behaviors (r p 0).
In contrast to the group-selection partition, the direct
and indirect fertility effects (bFi, pi and bFi, pj, respectively) in
the kin-selection partition, equation (1), can each be positive or negative, depending on r (eq. [4]; app. A1). In
the kin-selection terminology due to Hamilton (1964),
which defines “altruism” as a behavior with a negative
direct fitness effect and positive indirect fitness effects
(Rousset 2004; Lehmann and Keller 2006), this means that
whether cooperation is “altruistic” depends on both behavioral responsiveness and demographic factors that affect the scaled-relatedness coefficient r. Thus, cooperation
in a public-goods game may be “mutually beneficial” (West
et al. 2007) and not “altruistic” when behavioral responsiveness is high, since the direct effect on fertility (and
consequently fitness) may be positive. The distinction between mutually beneficial and altruistic cooperation is
conceptually important in social evolution, and a number
of recent reviews attempt to clarify this issue in detail (e.g.,
Lehmann and Keller 2006; West et al. 2007), because it
has often generated confusion (Kerr et al. 2004). In this
regard, the group-selection partition may be a more natural framework for public-goods scenarios than the kinselection partition, since the direction of between- and
within-group selection does not depend on r or r. In fact,
a public-goods scenario could be defined by payoffs that
yield positive between-group selection and negative
within-group selection.

(8)

The within-group component is always negative for r !
1 and r ! 1 and vanishes when either is equal to 1. Hence,
selection at the within-group level opposes an increase in
the amount of cooperation, but its force gets weaker as r
or r increases and disappears when either r or r equals 1.
Within-group selection vanishes with r p 1 because this
condition eliminates variation in the actions a ∗ and hence
within-group variation in fitness. Thus, even when individuals are highly responsive to one another’s actions,
within-group selection opposes an increase in the amount
of cooperation. The between-group selection component,
on the other hand, is positive when b/c 1 1/(N ⫺ 1) (assuming that r 1 ⫺1/(N ⫺ 1) and r 1 ⫺1/(N ⫺ 1); see appendixes A1 and A3, available online, for limits on r and
r), which is true so long as the total benefit of the social
trait outweighs the cost. This means that if cooperation is

Evolutionary Stability of Group-Optimal Behaviors
Exactly Group-Optimal Behaviors
During an ETI, selection within groups is eliminated and
between-group selection determines whether social behaviors increase or decrease in frequency. Continued
between-group selection will eventually lead to a convergence-stable outcome with social behaviors that maximize
the aggregate payoff to the group (see eq. [6]). With a
monomorphic population, maximizing the aggregate
group payoff implies that
b
1
p
c
N⫺1

(9)

(see app. A6, available online). The b/c ratio that satisfies
the group-optimality condition (9) will not, in general,
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maximize a single individual’s payoff, if one kept all other
individuals’ actions constant. For example, a focal individual might selfishly withhold its contribution to a public
good and increase its own payoff while hurting the aggregate payoff. However, when the social behaviors are
flexible, we also have to take into account how other individuals will respond to any changes in the focal individual’s behavior, which is done in equation (5).
Combining conditions (5) and (9), we can see that a
group-optimal outcome can be ES when
r ⫹ r ⫺ rr p 1.

(10)

Equation (10) is satisfied only when r or r or both are
equal to 1. In other words, evolutionary stability of a
group-optimal behavior requires either perfect relatedness,
corresponding to clonal groups, or perfect responsiveness,
corresponding to perfect behavioral matching of actions.
Either of these conditions is sufficient; that is, groupoptimal outcomes can be ES when r p 1 regardless of r,
and vice versa. The first condition (r p 1) is well known,
while a special case of the second condition has recently
been discovered in the two-person continuous prisoner’s
dilemma game without population structure (André and
Day 2007).
Almost-Group-Optimal Behaviors
The requirement that either r p 1 or r p 1 might still
seem restrictive, but it is essentially an artifact of requiring
exact group optimality. In reality, empirically distinguishing between exactly group-optimal behaviors and those
that are almost, but not precisely, group optimal is likely
to be difficult. This implies that the scope for what “looks”
group optimal might be even broader than previously expected. To see this, we can consider an outcome a ∗() that
is approximately group optimal and induces a ratio
b/c p (1 ⫹ )/(N ⫺ 1), where  1 0. As  r 0, the outcome
a ∗() approaches the exact group-optimal outcome. A
b/c ratio that is lower than (1 ⫹ )/(N ⫺ 1) implies an outcome closer to group optimality than is a ∗(). We can show
that a b/c ratio smaller than (1 ⫹ )/(N ⫺ 1) will be ES
whenever
r1

1 ⫺ r(1 ⫹ )
.
1 ⫺ r ⫹ [1 ⫹ r(N ⫺ 2)]

(11)

Since the right-hand side is always less than 1 for all
N ≥ 2 and 1 1 r 1 ⫺1/(N ⫺ 1), we can find a r ! 1 that
will make it possible for an outcome arbitrarily close to
the group-optimal outcome to be ES. Furthermore, we
can see in figure 2 that the threshold r required to make
an outcome ES is strictly decreasing with increased relatedness in the population. Figure 2 also shows that a com-

Figure 2: Threshold r from equation (11) required to make an outcome evolutionarily stable with a given level of divergence from the
group-optimal outcome. Here, we assume that N p 10. The solid
curve is for a b/c ratio 10% higher than the group-optimal ratio, the
dashed curve is for a b/c ratio 1% higher, and the dotted curve is
for a b/c ratio 0.1% higher.

bination of moderate r and moderate r is sufficient to
bring the ES outcome within 10% of group optimality,
suggesting that the scope for approximately group-optimal
behaviors can be much wider than previously recognized.
This also suggests that partial ETIs with meager amounts
of within-group selection require only moderate levels of
relatedness and behavioral responsiveness.
The Evolution of Behavioral Responses through
Prosocial Preferences
In the previous section, we discussed the effect of the
response coefficient r on selection acting on social behaviors, but we did not ask how r itself evolves. Previous
work shows that direct selection on r as an independent
trait occurs only to second order in the strength of selection (André and Day 2007; Akçay et al. 2009). However,
the behavioral response r is not independent of the social
action a ∗: both are produced by the proximate behavioral
mechanism. Hence, as the motivational traits underlying
the proximate mechanisms evolve, both a ∗ and r will coevolve with the motivational traits. Therefore, to study how
the response coefficient r evolves, we have to specify how
both the equilibrium actions and the behavioral responses
are produced by the proximate mechanism of behavior.
In this section, we do this by using a model for the evolution of prosocial preferences as the proximate cause of
social behavior.
In particular, we concentrate on the evolution of the
response coefficient r p 1, which ensures the stability of
group-optimal behaviors, from lower values of r. Our approach in this section is somewhat inverted, relative to
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conventional ESS analysis. Instead of searching for a general ES and CS outcome and determining when such an
outcome is group optimal, we find the conditions under
which the group-optimal outcome is ES and CS.
We analyze public-goods games where each individual
has the option to invest in an action that benefits everyone
in the group (including the focal individual) but incurs a
personal cost. Thus, the payoff to an individual i is given
by: ui p B (a 1, … , a N) ⫺ C (a i), where B is the public benefit and C denotes the private cost. (Note that these functions are different from b and c defined above.) This model
is a stylized description of many important social interactions, including cooperative hunting and defense or provisioning of a common brood of offspring.
Extending a recent model by Akçay et al. (2009), we
model individuals’ motivations for investment in the public good as deriving from innate goals. We represent these
innate goals mathematically by an objective function,
x i(a 1, a 2 , … , a N) for individual i. The objective function
fulfills a role similar to that of a utility or preference function in economics (e.g., Heifetz et al. 2007b) and is the
proximate cause of behavior: each individual “wants” to
achieve the maximum value of its objective function, given
what others do. The shape of the objective function of
individual xi is, in turn, determined by the motivational
trait pi that is the target of natural selection. The behavioral
equilibrium a∗ for this maximization process satisfies
⭸x i
⭸a i

F

p0

(12)

apa∗

for all i 苸 {1, … , N} (see app. A3 for stability conditions).
To obtain the response coefficient, we choose some j (
i, differentiate ⭸x j /⭸a j p 0 with respect to the motivational
trait of the focal individual pi, and solve for r p
(⭸a j /⭸pi)/(⭸a i /⭸pi) evaluated at a∗ in a monomorphic population, to obtain
rp⫺

⭸ 2x j /⭸a i ⭸a j
.
(N ⫺ 2)(⭸ 2x j /⭸a i ⭸a j ) ⫹ (⭸ 2x j /⭸a j2)

(13)

Expression (13) reduces to equation (9) of Akçay et al.
(2009) for N p 2.
The objective function x allows a natural characterization of the variation in prosocial preferences. First, individuals might vary in how they value the public benefit
relative to their private cost. Second, individuals might be
more or less cost averse, depending on how much public
benefit they receive, and thus vary in the direction and
strength of this aversion. To account for these two effects,
we assume that the objective function is determined by
B and C and is parametrized by two motivational traits v
and f, such that

x i(a 1, … , a N) p vB ⫺ (1 ⫺ fB)C.

(14)

Individuals with higher v place greater value on the public
good and are more unconditionally prosocial. Individuals
with positive f discount their costs as the provision of the
public good increases, similar to the behavior found in
some public-goods experiments (Fischbacher et al. 2001).
A pattern of conditional discounting of private costs,
which results in a conditional willingness to contribute,
might be termed “community reciprocity,” reflecting the
fact that individuals’ motivations are reciprocal not to any
particular individual but to the overall provision of public
good. The response coefficient r, given by equation (13),
evolves as both v and f evolve.
We first determine, for given a payoff function, the values of the phenotypic traits v∗ and f∗ that generate an
objective function that leads to an ES group-optimal outcome. These traits must satisfy two conditions: first, the
group-optimal outcome must be a proper behavioral equilibrium and satisfy equation (12) evaluated at v∗ and f∗;
and second, the objective functions must yield a response
coefficient r p 1 at the group-optimal behavioral equilibrium. These conditions allow us to find a unique
(v∗, f∗) pair that satisfies the first-order condition for evolutionary stability at the group-optimal behavioral
equilibrium.
To illustrate, we set N p 3 and use the following publicbenefit and private-cost functions:

冘
3

B(a 1, a 2 , a 3 ) p (1 ⫺ n)

冑a i ⫹ n冑a 1a 2a 3,

ip1

C(a) p a 2.

(15)

The parameter n (⫺1 ! n ! 1) measures how different individuals’ contributions to the public benefit interact with
each other. When n 1 0, investments by different individuals interact synergistically with each other: the more one
individual invests, the more valuable another individual’s
contribution becomes. The opposite holds when n ! 0 and
individuals’ investments become substitutes for each other.
The parameter n therefore captures an important aspect
of the ecology of the interaction. For example, cooperative
hunting might require simultaneous, synergistic efforts
from multiple individuals because of the requirement to
close all escape routes for the prey. This would make for
a positive n. Conversely, when provisioning offspring, the
increased effort by one individual would increase the food
coming into the nest and would decrease value of additional food from another individual. This would create a
negative n. In economics, these two possibilities are termed
complementary and substitutable inputs, respectively;
hence, we call n the complementarity parameter. Note that
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Figure 3: Values of v∗ (solid curve) and f∗ (dashed curve) that result
in an evolutionarily stable group-optimal outcome, plotted as functions of the parameter n that modulates whether different individuals’
contributions to the public benefit are substitutes (n ! 0 ) or complements (n 1 0).

B is always positive (for positive a), regardless of the sign
of n.
Figure 3 shows v∗ and f∗ as functions of the parameter
n; the more complementary the inputs from different individuals (higher n), the higher the valuation of the public
benefit relative to the private cost (v∗). Furthermore, over
the entire range of n, the trait for the interaction between
the public benefit and private cost, f∗, is positive and
increases with n. This means that an objective function
satisfying r p 1 at the group-optimal behavioral equilibrium exhibits the community-reciprocity property. As the
public benefit becomes more complementary, the level of
community reciprocity at the group-optimal outcome also
increases.
How do prosocial preferences with community reciprocity maintain a response coefficient of r p 1 proximately? Suppose a focal individual i has a positive f trait.
When its partner j increases investment aj in the public
good, this raises the value of B. From equation (14), one
can see that the focal individual i will then discount its
own cost more. This, in turn, would make the focal individual more willing to invest and would give rise to a
positive response coefficient (the reverse argument applies
when the partner invests less). Perfectly matching responses, r p 1, simply constitute an extreme case of such
positive responses.
However, as mentioned above, the first-order condition
for evolutionary stability does not guarantee that a population will in fact evolve to the candidate ESS when it is
initially away from it; this requires the convergencestability (CS) condition to be satisfied as well (Eshel and
Motro 1981; Christiansen 1991). Evaluating the CS condition for the group-optimal v∗ and f∗ traits found above,

we find that whether v∗ and f∗ are CS depends on the
relatedness coefficient r, which must be above a threshold
value to satisfy the CS condition (fig. 4). One interpretation of this result is that even though r p 1 guarantees
that the first-order ES condition is satisfied for a groupoptimal outcome, the evolution of r to this value crucially
depends on the relatedness being high enough. Thus, relatedness still plays an important role in determining
whether natural selection can drive a population to reach
these trait values. However, one can also observe from
figure 4 that the value of r required to render the groupoptimal traits CS is much less than 1 and that it decreases
as the complementarity parameter n increases. Hence, the
evolution of behaviors that maximize group benefit is possible for a range of organisms much wider than only those
that form clonal groups. Furthermore, ecological scenarios
with synergistic effects (such as cooperative hunting) permit the evolution of group-optimal outcomes under a
wider range of demographic conditions than do those with
substitute effects (such as offspring provisioning).
Discussion
In this article, we provide a general analysis, based on the
Price equation, of the evolution of flexible social behaviors
in structured populations. We show that behavioral responses and genetic relatedness (or similarity) have symmetric but independent effects on evolutionary stability;
thus, they cannot be collapsed into a single index (e.g., an
index of assortment; Fletcher and Doebeli 2009). Incorporating behavioral responses into a group-selection perspective elegantly emphasizes that social behaviors, such

Figure 4: Threshold value of relatedness required to make the groupoptimal trait values convergence stable, as a function of the complementarity parameter n. For this plot, we fixed the interaction term
f at its group-optimal value and looked at the convergent stability
of the valuation of the public good v when approaching its groupoptimal value.
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as cooperation, that benefit others at a cost to self are
always counterselected at the within-group level and positively selected at the between-group level, regardless of
how tightly coordinated individuals’ actions are. We also
show that the classic result that cooperation increases in
populations if and only if between-group selection is stronger than within-group selection (Wade 1980) generalizes
to the case with behavioral responses. Furthermore, we
show that behavioral responses and relatedness can interact synergistically in promoting the evolution of social
behavior and specifically the evolution of group-optimal
traits that might lead to ETIs. This synergistic relationship
becomes particularly apparent in considerations of
whether or not a group-optimal outcome is convergence
stable, since relatedness must exceed a threshold value in
order for convergence stability to be achieved. By applying
our general model to a proximate mechanism based on
behavioral objectives or social preferences, we also show
how behavioral responses can evolve through the evolution
of the valuation of public goods versus private costs and
how this evolution depends on the level of synergism in
contributions to the ecological benefit.
The Scope for Group Optimality
Our model provides a new analysis of the conditions that
can lead to group optimality. In this respect, it is useful
to compare our model to recent work by Gardner and
Grafen (2009), who analyze the premise that natural selection is always expected to lead to group-optimal outcomes. Linking optimization of group fitness to a Price
equation formalism, they find a formal justification for
this premise only with clonal groups when r p 1. In the
general case when r ( 1, their analysis finds that group
adaptations are not expected but are also not ruled out.
Since Gardner and Grafen focus exclusively on genetically
fixed behaviors, their analysis does not include the possible
effects of evolving behavioral responses. In contrast, our
model explicitly incorporates the effects of behavioral responses generated by proximate mechanisms, which allows
us to consider the evolution of proximate mechanisms that
eliminate within-group conflict (by yielding r p 1) even
without complete clonality. This allows us to derive more
specific conditions for when group-optimal behaviors are
evolutionarily and convergent stable; such behaviors satisfy
Gardner and Grafen’s definition of a group adaptation (for
an alternative definition, see Sober and Wilson 2011). We
find that group adaptations sensu Gardner and Grafen are
possible without clonal groups so long as relatedness meets
a threshold that depends on the ecology of the interaction.
Thus, we argue that their conclusion that “between-group
selection can lead to group adaptation, but only in rather
special circumstances” (Gardner and Grafen 2009, p. 668)

underestimates the scope for group optimality. It is true
that there is no unqualified justification for group fitness
maximization, but as we show, there exists ample scope
for the evolution of traits that result in either exactly or
approximately group-optimal outcomes without requiring
clonal groups.
One of the reasons that group optimality is important
is its connection to ETIs. In order for an ETI to occur,
either a demographic mechanism that ensures high relatedness (such as group formation by single propagules;
Rainey and Kerr 2010) or a behavioral mechanism that
ensures high behavioral responsiveness (such as strong
prosocial preferences or policing) is needed to eliminate
within-group selection. Once within-group selection is
eliminated, extended between-group selection can drive a
population toward a convergence-stable outcome with social behaviors that maximize group fitness. By illuminating
the synergistic relationship between behavioral responsiveness and relatedness in determining when group optimality is convergence stable, our work suggests conditions under which ETIs themselves might be stable. Of
course, a complete model of an ETI must detail how individuals specialize on different tasks (Gavrilets 2010) or
how some types reproduce and others do not, such as in
the germ-soma distinction (Michod et al. 2006); explicitly
incorporating behavioral responses into models of task
specialization is thus an important next step in future
work.
Proximate Mechanisms and Objective Functions
The distinction between proximate and ultimate causes of
behavior has been much emphasized in evolutionary biology with the recognition that proximate mechanisms can
constrain adaptation of social behaviors (West et al. 2007).
However, there has been little explicit modeling of the role
of proximate mechanisms in social evolution. In this regard, our model provides a connection between socialevolution theory and the conceptual work in evolutionary
genetics that focuses on dissecting the genotype-phenotype
map and determining how this map evolves (i.e., the evolution of epistasis and pleiotropy; Hansen 2006; Wagner
and Zhang 2011). In our model, the genotype-phenotype
map is produced by the proximate behavioral mechanism,
which translates heritable motivational traits (e.g., prosocial preferences) into actions. Given that the phenotype
of interest is often fitness, the map also includes how actions translate into fitness through ecological payoffs. Just
as the structure of gene regulatory networks determines
how mutations affect gene expression, the cognitive and
ecological constraints produced by a particular behavioral
mechanism determine how responsive individuals can be
to one another, given a particular demographic context
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and relatedness. At the same time, our results also highlight
the fact that behavioral responses through proximate
mechanisms not only can constrain but also can facilitate
the evolution of certain behaviors, such as those that maximize group benefit.
On a more practical level, our approach provides a toolkit to answer empirically salient questions about how specific behavioral mechanisms evolve. Here, we illustrate this
by considering a proximate mechanism based on social
preferences and asking how individuals evolve to value
public goods and private costs in a public-goods game.
We find that the objective functions that result in groupoptimal outcomes involve discounting of the private cost
of each individual as the provision of the public good
increases (i.e., a positive f trait). We also show that relatedness and complementarity of benefits enhances this
discounting. Although direct measurements of motivations are scarce to nonexistent, some indirect evidence for
such a pattern exists. For example, Fischbacher et al.
(2001) performed an experiment that asked for a contribution schedule to a public good as a function of the
average contributions of others and found that the most
common pattern among Swiss undergraduates was monotonically increasing contributions; this is consistent with
the pattern that would be produced by a positive f trait.
We believe that experiments in humans and animals directly aimed at capturing motivational states will be helpful
in elucidating the underlying mechanism of decision making in social dilemmas.
Indirect Genetic Effects and Behavioral Responses in
Structured Populations
There are important connections between our model and
indirect-genetic-effects (IGE) models of quantitative genetics (e.g., Moore et al. 1997; Wolf et al. 1999; Bijma and
Wade 2008; McGlothlin et al. 2010). The IGE approach
measures the strength of selection on social behaviors by
modeling the trait value of a focal individual as the sum
of a direct genetic effect due to the focal individual and
an IGE due to social partners. Using this framework,
McGlothlin et al. (2010) derive an expression for the
change in the mean of phenotype due to both individual
and social effects on fitness analogous to our equation (4).
In appendix A9, available online, we show that their coefficient of IGE, w, fulfills a role similar to r and that the
change in mean phenotype from our equation (4) and that
from equation (18) of McGlothlin et al. (2010) become
equivalent when w p r/[1 ⫹ r(N ⫺ 2)], their nonsocialselection gradient bN is the cost ⫺c, and their socialselection gradient bS is the benefit b. Thus, it is possible
to map between our model and the IGE framework without changing the first-order evolutionary-stability predic-

tions. However, our formulation highlights the exact symmetry between the scaled relatedness r and r. In contrast,
r and w are not symmetric for N 1 2 in phenotypic IGE
models (McGlothlin et al. 2010), and other IGE models
wrap behavioral responses into effects on variance components (see app. A9; Griffing 1981a; Bijma et al. 2007;
Bijma and Wade 2008). The exact symmetry between r
and r is an important feature because it reflects the fact
that correlations between individuals’ behavior have the
same structural effect on selection regardless of whether
those correlations are due to behavioral responses on the
timescale of an interaction or to demographic factors that
operate on a longer timescale. Moreover, we explicitly
model the dependence of r on the proximate mechanisms
that generate behavioral responses (such as the mechanism
modeled in eq. [12]). This approach allows us to directly
address the evolution of the phenotypic correlations given
by r rather than treating it as an exogenously determined
index, as the IGE literature has done so far.
In simple panmictic populations, there has been much
work in both biology and economics on the evolution of
flexible, responsive, or contingent behaviors. The most
closely related models in biology are models of the continuous iterated prisoner’s dilemma (CIPD; McNamara et
al. 1999; Wahl and Nowak 1999; André and Day 2007)
that look at the evolution of linear-response rules; given
a behavioral mechanism of linear responses, the response
slope is analogous to r. In economics, the most related
field is that of “indirect evolution” (Güth 1995; Dekel et
al. 2007; Heifetz et al. 2007a; Alger and Weibull 2010),
which allows individuals to choose actions based on individual preferences and studies the evolution of those
preferences. This work has focused mostly on the informational constraints required for players to act in a way
that does not maximize their immediate self-interest. Unlike either the CIPD approach or most of the indirectevolution literature, we embed the behavioral model in a
structured population that allows for multiple levels of
selection and selection among kin. Importantly, our general framework can be used with any behavioral model
that allows one to calculate expected equilibrium behavioral outcomes and behavioral responses at that
equilibrium.
In addition, our unified framework can also be used to
study how group size and demographic parameters separately affect behavioral responsiveness and relatedness.
For example, although larger groups are often less cooperative than smaller ones because of the decrease of relatedness with increasing group size, we can show that the
opposite may be true under special conditions (app. A8,
available online). Future work should therefore focus on
how group-beneficial outcomes might evolve in response
to environmental variability and a number of demographic
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variables, including population size, dispersal rate, extinction risk, and carrying capacity (Lehmann and Rousset
2010).
Conclusion
We show that behavioral responses can significantly expand the scope for group-optimal behaviors that are associated with ETIs. Our results emphasize the important
interplay between behavioral responses and relatedness
and show that the two can reinforce each other to sustain
higher levels of group benefit than would result from each
in isolation. Our model also highlights the crucial role of
proximate mechanisms of behavior in determining the
magnitude and evolution of behavioral responses. A promising direction for future work is to combine models such
as this one and experiments in humans and animals aimed
at capturing motivational states: experiments can elucidate
the underlying neurological mechanisms of decision making in social dilemmas, whereas models can illuminate
relevant selection pressures that shape the evolution of
these mechanisms.
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Akçay, E., J. Van Cleve, M. W. Feldman, and J. E. Roughgarden. 2009.
A theory for the evolution of other-regard integrating proximate
and ultimate perspectives. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the USA 106:19061–19066. doi:10.1073/pnas
.0904357106.
Alexander, R. D., and G. Borgia. 1978. Group selection, altruism,
and the levels of organization of life. Annual Review of Ecology
and Systematics 9:449–474.
Alger, I., and J. W. Weibull. 2010. Evolutionary stability, co-operation

and Hamilton’s rule. Carleton Economic Paper 10-11. Department
of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON.
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